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Economic integration is a key theme of the global era in which we live
today. Perhaps the single most important example of such integration in
recent decades is the European Union.
From the ashes of the wartime years, six core European nations forged a
confederation that gradually grew to encompass 15 members and then 25. As
the EU evolved into an economically freer and more integrated group of
nations, the overall European economy has grown to the point where it rivals
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Globalization is one of the most debated and
analyzed phenomena of our time. Declining trade
barriers and advances in technology have made it
possible for consumers in the United States and
around the world to purchase a variety of goods
and services that would have been impossible a
generation ago. 
Cheaper imports have contributed to higher
standards of living, but the growth of trade has
also been associated with job losses as production
shifts toward lowest cost producers. Freer flows of
capital have made it easier for investors to seek
out high returns and diversify their portfolios.
International capital flows have also made it easier
for businesses to raise funds for investment pro-
jects by making them less dependent on domestic
institutions. Inflows of foreign capital have helped
raise living standards in emerging market
economies and have also increased the pressure
on these countries’ governments to pursue sound
fiscal and monetary policies. A simple definition 
of globalization: the
increased interdependence
of national economies as
manifested in greater
flows of goods, services
and capital across
national borders.
These and many other aspects of
globalization have been written about at
great length. However, relatively little 
attention has been paid to the question
of how a more integrated world econ-
omy might impact the conduct of mone-
tary policy in the United States and
around the world. In this article I ex-
plore some ideas about what globaliza-
tion might mean for monetary policy.
I start by explaining what econo-
mists understand by globalization, offer-
ing a definition of the phenomenon and
showing some measures of its extent.
These measures also give us some histor-
ical perspective and show that in many
ways globalization is not new.
1 I then
highlight a key difference between the
last era of globalization and the current
one, namely, the monetary standard, and
discuss some of the implications of this
for monetary policy. 
Defining Globalization
Globalization means different things
to different people. Indeed, the term glob-
alization is much overused. It is taken to
refer to many things, from the spread of
culture and ideas to the ease of communi-
cation and travel in the era of the Internet
and jet aircraft. Supporters of globalization
hail the greater ease and quality of life in
a globalized world; critics claim that free
trade simultaneously impoverishes work-
ers in poor countries while desecrating the
environment and promoting mass homog-
enization.
There are also many popular mea-
sures of globalization. For example, a
recent issue of Foreign Policy magazine
ranked countries in terms of a variety of
criteria to come up with a list of the most
globalized countries.
2 Singapore was
ranked No. 1; the United States ranked
fourth, behind Ireland and Switzerland.
Among the factors that went into the rat-
ings were international travel and tourism,
membership in international organizations,
contributions to United Nations peace-
keeping missions, international telephone
traffic, Internet hosts and so on. 
I propose a simple economic defini-
tion of globalization as the increased in-
terdependence of national economies as
manifested in greater flows of goods,
services and capital across national bor-
ders. In a fully globalized world, goods,
labor and capital would move between
countries with the same ease with which
they move within countries. Consumers
in Texas could buy goods and services
from producers in Taiwan as readily as
they buy from producers in Tennessee.
Workers in Germany would be free to
move to Ireland or the United States in
pursuit of employment opportunities. In-
vestors in China could freely choose
between putting their savings in domestic
bank accounts or using them to purchase
shares in U.S. and European firms.
Once we have defined what we mean
by globalization, we can set about con-
structing some measures of its extent. If
markets were completely integrated and
there were no trade barriers, identical
goods and services would be priced very
similarly around the world. The only dif-
ferences would be due to transportation
costs. Likewise, wage differentials would
be eliminated, and equally risky assets
would yield the same return. However, it
is difficult to obtain the data needed to
make such comparisons, so I rely instead
on less perfect measures based on flows
of goods, services, labor and capital
across national borders. One advantage
of these indicators of globalization is that
they allow comparison of trends over
long periods. This is an important con-
sideration if we are to bring some histor-
ical perspective to the issue and make
inferences about globalization’s impact
on monetary policy.
Measures of Globalization
Flows of Goods and Services. Per-
haps the most basic measure of the
extent of globalization as I have defined
it is the volume of trade between coun-
tries. Chart 1 shows global exports as a
share of global gross domestic product
(GDP) for selected years back to the late
19th century.
3 The years shown are major
milestones in global economic history:
the classical gold standard began in 1870
and effectively ended with the outbreak
of war in 1914; the Great Depression
began in 1929; the post–World War II era
of rapid growth began in 1950 and
ended in 1973. 
The chart gives some idea of just
how globalized the world was at the turn
of the 20th century. Global trade peaked
at 9 percent of global GDP in 1929,
before collapsing as a result of the De-
pression and World War II. By 1950,
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output. They recovered steadily, however,
as the world economy expanded and
trade restrictions imposed during the in-
terwar years were lowered. By 2003, the
last year for which we have data, global
exports amounted to just over 20 percent
of global GDP. 
Flows of Capital. Another important
dimension of globalization is flows of cap-
ital. Other things being equal, basic eco-
nomic reasoning predicts that capital
should tend to flow from countries where
capital is abundant to countries where
capital is scarce. And indeed this is what
happened prior to World War I. Chart 2
shows foreign capital stock as a share of
the GDP of developing countries
(defined as Africa, non-Japan Asia and
Latin America). On the eve of World War
I, foreign investment amounted to almost
one-third of developing countries’ GDP.
In the post–World War II period, the
share of foreign investment has never
approached this level, so along this
dimension, the world is a lot less global-
ized than it used to be. 
A more comprehensive view of global
capital flows is obtained by taking into
account the large flows of capital that
now occur between developed countries
in addition to the flows from rich to poor
countries. One simple measure of this
broader concept of capital mobility is the
stock of foreign liabilities as a percent-
age of global GDP. As Chart 3 shows,
this ratio has increased steadily over time,
from around 25 percent in 1980 to nearly
140 percent today. Much of this takes the
form of rich countries borrowing from
and lending to other rich countries. For
example, the European Union remains
the single most important destination of
U.S. direct investment abroad and also the
single most important source of direct
investment in the United States.
Flows of Labor. It is more difficult to
get comprehensive data on the movement
of workers between countries over long
periods. We all know there were mass
movements of people from the Old
World to the New World in the 19th cen-
tury. Less well documented are the mi-
grations that took place in other parts of
the world and at other times. Here I focus
just on migration to the United States. 
Chart 4 shows the importance of im-
migration as measured by the share of
the foreign-born in the total U.S. popula-
tion. While the number of immigrants to
the United States in recent years exceeds
what we experienced in the 19th cen-
tury, they make up a smaller share of the
population. In the 2000 census, foreign-
born residents made up 12.5 percent of
the U.S. population—still somewhat
below the near 15 percent that immi-
grants accounted for in the 19th century.
Because of immigration restrictions and
the rise of the welfare state, we are
unlikely to ever again see movement of
workers across national boundaries on a
scale comparable with what we saw in
the late 19th century. But it is also worth
bearing in mind the rise of what some
have referred to as virtual immigration
(or offshore outsourcing), where new
technologies make it easier to take jobs
to workers rather than have the workers
come to the jobs in the United States. 
By the way, the United States is not
unique in receiving large inflows of im-
migrants in recent years. Foreign-born
nationals are a higher percentage of the
populations of several other developed
countries, including Australia (23 percent),
Switzerland (22.4 percent) and Canada
(19.3 percent). And immigrants account
for about the same share of the popula-
tions of Germany and Austria as they do in
the United States.
4 According to the United
Nations, in 2002 some 175 million people,
or about 3 percent of the world’s popu-
lation, lived outside their country of birth.
5
The extent of globalization on the
eve of World War I was famously sum-
marized by the great British economist
John Maynard Keynes in his book cri-
tiquing the Treaty of Versailles, The Eco-
nomic Consequences of the Peace (see
box). This quote from Keynes is proba-
bly overused in the literature on global-
ization, but it is nevertheless an important
warning not to take for granted the gains
of recent decades. The liberal interna-
tional economic order is under constant
5
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SOURCE: Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial
Perspective, OECD, 2001, Table F-5, “Merchandise
Exports as Per Cent of GDP in 1990 Prices.”
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which much if not all of the progress we
have made in the postwar period would
be quickly reversed. 
Commodity Money
and Fiat Money
Given that the world has experienced
globalization on a scale comparable with
what we are witnessing today, it seems
reasonable to look at how central bankers
conducted monetary policy during the
earlier era to see what lessons it may hold
for contemporary monetary policy. Un-
fortunately, history offers relatively little
guidance on this issue. Here’s why.
A major difference between the cur-
rent era of globalization and the last era
has to do with the monetary institutions.
At the turn of the 20th century, most of
the world was on a commodity standard;
currencies were backed by precious met-
als, in almost all cases gold. The need to
maintain convertibility into precious met-
als limited the ability of central banks to
change interest rates at will; that is, central
banks had very limited discretion when
it came to monetary policy. 
One of the great benefits of the com-
modity standards that prevailed in the
previous era of globalization was that
price levels were relatively stable. Peri-
odic inflations were followed by defla-
tions, with the result that over long periods
the price level remained nearly constant.
There is some debate about whether this
greater price stability was accompanied
by greater instability of the real econ-
omy. The idea of using monetary policy
to smooth out the business cycle is very
much a by-product of the Keynesian rev-
olution during the interwar period.
To get a sense of just how much
nominal stability the gold standard con-
ferred, take a look at Chart 5, which shows
the price level in the United States for
the past two centuries. It is clear that the
level was a lot more stable under the
gold standard than it was after its aban-
donment. Between 1820, when the
United States went on the gold standard,
and 1932, when the gold standard was
abandoned, the average annual inflation
rate in the United States was essentially
zero. Since 1932, the average annual in-
flation rate has been about 3.8 percent,
although in recent years the rate has been
lower than that. However, the greater
long-run stability of prices that prevailed
when the United States was on the gold
standard came at the cost of greater short-
and medium-run volatility of inflation
rates.
6
While the classical gold standard era
ended essentially in the interwar period,
the last vestiges did not really disappear
until the early 1970s, when the so-called
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange
rates collapsed. Since then, the world has
been on what economists call a fiat mon-
etary standard, in which national curren-
cies are no longer backed by precious
metals or other commodities. They are no
longer convertible into something other
than themselves. 
This in itself raises interesting prob-
lems for monetary theorists: Why are
people willing to exchange valuable goods
and services for objects that have no
inherent value? This might seem like a
rather esoteric question, but coming up
with a satisfactory answer has proven
quite difficult. While it might seem that
spending time on such a question is an
Price Level in the United States
Index: 1820 = 1
Chart 5
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cause it has implications for many of the
other more practical problems that mon-
etary policymakers have to deal with on
a regular basis.
Let’s consider three important impli-
cations of fiat money standards for mon-
etary policy. 
The Size of the Money Stock. One
of the key characteristics of fiat money is
that it is for all intents and purposes cost-
less to create.
7 Yet fiat currency has a
positive value to society as a whole
because it facilitates economic activity.
In a famous article, Milton Friedman first
posed the question of how a central
bank should determine the size of the
money supply under such circum-
stances.
8 Basic economic reasoning indi-
cates that the optimal amount of any
commodity is the amount that equates
the marginal cost of producing it to the
marginal cost of using it. The opportu-
nity cost of holding money is essentially
the short-term interest rate, so Friedman
concluded that the optimal quantity of
money for society as a whole is the
quantity that drives short-term interest
rates to zero. With real interest rates
determined by savings and investment
opportunities and presumably positive,
this would call for central banks to engi-
neer steady deflations to maximize wel-
fare.
The logic of Friedman’s argument is
compelling, yet it has never convinced
central bankers. As recent U.S. and Japan-
ese experience shows, central bankers
are very adverse to deflation, arguably
more so than they are to inflation. Part of
the reason for this is that we do not fully
understand how deflations work and
whether there is a meaningful distinction
between “good” and “bad” deflations. 
Rules Versus Discretion. A second
key feature of fiat monetary standards is
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‘The Economic Consequences of the Peace’
What an extraordinary episode in the
economic progress of man that age was
which came to an end in August, 1914! The
greater part of the population, it is true,
worked hard and lived at a low standard of
comfort, yet were, to all appearances, rea-
sonably contented with this lot. But escape
was possible, for any man of capacity or
character at all exceeding the average, into
the middle and upper classes, for whom life
offered, at a low cost and with the least trou-
ble, conveniences, comforts, and amenities
beyond the compass of the richest and most
powerful monarchs of other ages. The inhab-
itant of London could order by telephone,
sipping his morning tea in bed, the various
products of the whole earth, in such quantity
as he might see fit, and reasonably expect
their early delivery upon his door-step; he
could at the same moment and by the same
means adventure his wealth in the natural
resources and new enterprises of any quarter
of the world, and share, without exertion or
even trouble, in their prospective fruits and
advantages; or he could decide to couple the
security of his fortunes with the good faith of
the townspeople of any substantial munici-
pality in any continent that fancy or informa-
tion might recommend. He could secure
forthwith, if he wished it, cheap and comfort-
able means of transit to any country or cli-
mate without passport or other formality,
could despatch his servant to the neighbor-
ing office of a bank for such supply of the
precious metals as might seem convenient,
and could then proceed abroad to foreign
quarters, without knowledge of their religion,
language, or customs, bearing coined wealth
upon his person, and would consider himself
greatly aggrieved and much surprised at the
least interference. But, most important of all,
he regarded this state of affairs as normal,
certain, and permanent, except in the direc-
tion of further improvement, and any devia-
tion from it as aberrant, scandalous, and
avoidable. The projects and politics of mili-
tarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural
rivalries, of monopolies, restrictions, and
exclusion, which were to play the serpent to
this paradise, were little more than the
amusements of his daily newspaper, and
appeared to exercise almost no influence at
all on the ordinary course of social and eco-
nomic life, the internationalization of which
was nearly complete in practice.
—John Maynard Keynes, The Economic 
Consequences of the Peace,
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe,
1920, pp. 10–12.
One of the key
characteristics of 
fiat money is that it 
is for all intents and
purposes costless to 
create. Yet fiat currency
has a positive value to
society as a whole 
because it facilitates
economic activity.that because the central bank is not re-
quired to maintain convertibility of the
currency into some intrinsically valuable
commodity, it has considerable discre-
tion as to how rapidly it lets the money
stock grow and prices increase. In 2004,
Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott re-
ceived the Nobel Prize in economics for
(among other things) work they did
pointing out how central banks may be
tempted to create too much inflation in
such circumstances, even if they are acting
in the best interests of society as a whole.
9
Largely as a result of the work of
Kydland and Prescott, economists have
spent the past decade thinking about
optimal rules for monetary policy. There
is general agreement among economists
and central bankers alike that monetary
policy should be rule based, although
there is less agreement as to what form
desirable rules should take. One of the
most popular rules for central bank be-
havior is one devised by John Taylor of
Stanford University, relating the setting
of interest rates to measures of the devi-
ation of output from potential (the out-
put gap) and the deviation of inflation
from target.
10 As economies become more
open and exposed to global trade, it is
worth asking whether the optimal speci-
fication of such rules needs to change to
take account of broader measures of
slack and inflation pressures.
Exchange Rates. A third feature of
fiat money is that in the absence of any 
restrictions on what currencies house-
holds  and businesses may use, the
exchange rate between them is indetermi-
nate.
11 That is, in a fully integrated world
where governments did not intervene in
foreign exchange markets, the exchange
rate between any two currencies will be
whatever holders of the currencies expect
it to be. Thus, under a floating exchange
rate regime, exchange rates will be un-
predictable and will impose unnecessary
costs on households and businesses seek-
ing to do business with foreign countries.
Arguably a better state of affairs would
be a system of fixed exchange rates, with
central banks agreeing to convert each
others’ liabilities on demand and in any
amount and sharing the seigniorage reve-
nue from money creation according to a
preset formula. This is something like what
the Europeans have agreed to do with
economic and monetary union (EMU).
Globalization and Disinflation
A more practical question might be
to ask how globalization has impacted
inflation. For about a quarter century fol-
lowing the end of World War II, the Bret-
ton Woods system of fixed exchange rates
anchored inflation rates around the world.
As Chart 6 shows, for about 10 years fol-
lowing the end of World War II not a sin-
gle country experienced high inflation,
which I define as an annual rate in excess
of 25 percent. From the late 1950s until
the early 1970s, episodes of high inflation
were still rather rare. With the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system in 1971 and
the oil shocks that followed, episodes of
high inflation became a lot more com-
mon, with no fewer than 49 countries
experiencing high inflation in 1994. But
note that since then, the number of
countries experiencing high inflation has
declined to nearly zero. The average
inflation rate has also declined, from a
peak of more than 35 percent in the
early 1990s to less than 5 percent today. 
This decline has taken place at the
same time that world trade has continued
to grow, prompting some analysts to claim
that there is a causal link between the two.
Cruder versions of this story routinely con-
fuse relative price changes and price level
changes. More sophisticated versions look
at the political economy of monetary pol-
icy and examine how globalization has
altered the incentives of central banks to
engineer inflation.
One basic story that builds on the in-
sights of Kydland and Prescott goes as fol-
lows.
12 In the presence of taxes, tariffs
and other regulations that cause econom-
ic activity to be lower than it would be
otherwise, central banks that are not
bound by rules will have an incentive to
try to engineer surprise inflations to boost
economic activity. Households and busi-
nesses understand the incentive of cen-
tral banks to behave this way and come
to expect the higher inflation. The net
result is higher inflation with no gain in
real economic activity. However, as the
taxes, tariffs and regulations that depress
economic activity are removed, the in-
centive of central banks to engineer higher
inflation will fall and so, too, will the
actual inflation rate. Thus, we might ex-
pect to see declining inflation as the world
becomes more integrated as a result of
deregulation and freer trade. 





monetary policy should 
be rule based, although
there is less agreement
as to what form 
desirable rules 
should take.Appealing as this story might be, it is
not the only one we can tell to interpret
what we have seen over the past couple
of years. An alternative and equally plau-
sible explanation is that central banks
have simply learned the limits of their abi-
lity to fine-tune the economy after the ex-
periences of the 1970s in the industrial-
ized countries and of the 1980s and 1990s
in the emerging market economies. Many
central banks now have formal inflation
targets and have been granted indepen-
dence to pursue price stability as a primary
goal. Under this reading of the data, the
simultaneous decline of inflation and
growth of globalization are simply coinci-
dence. An important research question is
the relative importance of the two expla-
nations in accounting for what has been
going on.
A cursory examination of the data
shows that it is far from clear what the
answer will be. As you can see in Chart
7, there was indeed a significant decline
in the prevalence of inflation around the
world during the past decade, during
which the share of exports in global GDP
increased from around one-fifth to around
one-quarter. However, note that an even
larger increase in the importance of trade
occurred during the 1970s and 1980s as
inflation was accelerating. If growth in
world trade acted as a restraint on infla-
tion in recent years, why wasn’t it equally
successful at restraining inflation in the
earlier period? 
Conclusions
This article has shown that in many
ways, there is nothing new about global-
ization. In the years prior to World War I,
goods, capital and labor flowed across
national borders with the same ease as
they do today and, in some cases, with
greater ease. However, the monetary
standard under which globalization took
place in the late 19th and early 20th cen-
turies was very different from the mone-
tary standard under which globalization
is occurring today. And therein lies the
challenge for monetary policymakers.
This article has scratched the surface
of what the greater integration of the
world economy might mean for monetary
policy in the United States and around
the world. I reviewed a small subset of
the issues that globalization raises for
monetary policymakers. There are many
more that need to be addressed.
For example, how exactly should we
define and measure the phenomenon of
globalization? I presented some simple
measures of globalization based on ex-
port data, capital flows and migration. A
more economically meaningful measure
of globalization would probably look at
consumption volatility as well and the co-
movement of consumption in different
countries. 
How does globalization affect strat-
egy and tactics of monetary policy? Does
globalization make the case for an ex-
plicit numerical price objective for mon-
etary policy (an inflation target) more or
less compelling? How does globalization
affect the so-called Phillips curve, that is,
the relationship between inflation and un-
employment (or something similar) that
forms such an important part of many
central bankers’ analytical apparatus?
There are grounds for thinking that in
economies that are more open to trade
and capital flows, a decline in the unem-
ployment rate, other things being equal,
is associated with a smaller increase in
inflation.
13 Of course, there is also a body
of thought that argues that even in
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essentially useless as a guide for setting
interest rates, and it is arguably just as
useless in an open economy. 
I discussed how under a fiat money
standard, fixed exchange rates may be
preferable to floating exchange rates.
Would the United States really be better
off if we were to participate in a new
system of fixed exchange rates with the
dollar, the euro and the yen pegged at
1–1–100, as some have suggested?
Should there be more coordination of
monetary and fiscal policies between the
major economies, or is conversation
preferable to formal coordination, as
Federal Reserve Board Vice Chairman
Roger Ferguson recently suggested?
14
Has globalization had a strong effect
on global inflation, or is the improved in-
flation performance of the past decade
or so due to better policy on the part of
central banks around the world? Is China
having a restraining influence on U.S.
inflation, as some have suggested? Or is
it still too small to account for more than
a few tenths of a percent of the lower
inflation in the United States in recent
years, as Federal Reserve Board research
seems to suggest?
15
These and many other questions will
be addressed in subsequent articles in
this and other Federal Reserve Bank of
Dallas publications in coming years.
—Mark A. Wynne
Wynne is a vice president in the Research
Department of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Dallas.
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